Combinatorial markets where bids can be submitted on bundles of items can be economically desirable coordination mechanisms in multiagent systems where the items exhibit complementarity and substitutability. There has been a surge of research on winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In this paper we study a wider range of combinatorial market designs: auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal. We first theoretically characterize the complexity of finding a feasible, approximate, or optimal solution. Reverse auctions with free disposal can be approximated (even in the multi-unit case), although auctions cannot. When XOR-constraints between bids are allowed (to express substitutability), the hardness turns the other way around: even finding a feasible solution for a reverse auction or exchanges is N P-complete, while in auctions that is trivial. Finally, in all of the cases without free disposal, even finding a feasible solution is N P-complete.
INTRODUCTION
Combinatorial markets can be used to reach economically efficient allocations of goods, services, tasks, resources, etc., in multiagent systems even when the agents' valuations for bundles of items are not additive. Some items can be complementary, and others can be substitutes.
While combinatorial markets have major economic advantages, they can be computationally complex to clear. There has been a recent surge of interest in developing combinatorial clearing algorithms [14, 16, 3, 10, 17, 1, 8, 2, 13, 19] . However, the bulk of this work has focused on single-unit combinatorial auctions with free disposal, with some work on multi-unit combinatorial auctions with free disposal [15, 17, 12, 5] . Certain other generalizations have also been discussed, but their complexity has not been analyzed theoretically or experimentally [15, 17] .
In this paper we study the complexity of the other main variants of combinatorial markets. We study auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges. In each setting we study the single-unit as well as the multi-unit case. We analyze each of these variations with and without free disposal.
1 This leads to 3 × 2 × 2 = 12 important settings, of which only 2 have received significant attention so far. We also study the theoretical impacts of XOR-constraints among bids, in terms of complexity of finding a feasible, approximate, or optimal solution.
We first define the different market types. For each market type, we theoretically determine the complexity of finding a feasible, approximate, or optimal solution. We then compare the types experimentally.
CLASSES OF COMBINATORIAL MARKETS
In this section we introduce different combinatorial market types, and discuss the complexity of winner determination from a theoretical perspective.
Single-Unit Auctions
The most basic combinatorial auction, and the type that has received most of the attention in previous work [16, 3, 17] , is a single-unit combinatorial auction with free disposal. 
If there is no free disposal (auctioneer is not willing to keep any of the items, and bidders are not willing to take extra items), an equality is used in place of the inequality.
By now it is well known that (the decision version of) BCAWDP with free disposal (even with integer prices) is N P-complete [14] . It cannot even be approximated to a ratio of n 1− in polytime (unless P = ZPP) -as shown in [16] via an approximation-preserving reduction from MAX CLIQUE which is inapproximable [6] . However, finding a feasible solution is trivial (if there is free disposal): any bid alone constitutes a feasible solution. Another trivial feasible solution is that where no bids are accepted.
Multi-Unit Auctions
When there are multiple indistinguishable goods for sale, it is usually desirable (from a bid compactness and winner determination complexity perspective) to represent these goods as multiple units of a single item, rather than as multiple items. Different items can have multiple units each, where units of one item are indistinguishable but units of different items are distinguishable. This representation allows a bidder to place a single bid requesting the amount of each item that he wants, instead of placing separate bids on the potentially enormous number of combinations that would amount to those numbers of units of those items. An auction that allows this type of bidding is called a multi-unit combinatorial auction. They have been used, for example, in the eMediator ecommerce server prototype [15] , and recent research has studied winner determination in this context [17, 12, 5] . Multi-unit auctions have many potential real-world applications including bandwidth allocation and electric power markets. The winner determination problem for multi-unit auctions follows. Proof. Immediate from the N P-completeness and inapproximability of BCAWDP since that is a special case (ui = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}).
Again, finding a feasible solution is trivial: even any bid alone would constitute a feasible solution.
Reverse Auctions
In many market scenarios, for example in procurement, there is a buyer who wants to obtain some goods at the lowest possible cost, and a set of sellers who can provide the goods. The buyer can hold a reverse auction to try to obtain the goods. Again, if there is complementarity or substitutability between the goods, a combinatorial reverse auction can be beneficial. Each seller submits "asks" that say how much the seller asks for each bundle of goods she can provide. A single-unit combinatorial reverse auction is a special case of a multi-unit combinatorial reverse auction, so we only present the latter formally. . Assign w(e) = γ for each unit e newly covered by Aj. Note 2 This is a different problem than WEIGHTED SET PACK-ING, which is analogous to BCAWDP with free disposal. 3 The special case of this algorithm for single-unit combinatorial reverse auctions is the same as the classic greedy algorithm for WEIGHTED SET COVERING. It is known that it achieves a (1 + ln m )-approximation for the problem, where m is the largest number of items that any one ask contains [7] . 4 With a more complex analysis of the same algorithm, we can tighten the approximation guarantee to (1+ln N ) where N is the largest number of units that any one ask contains. We omit that complex proof due to limited space. Furthermore, an O(ln m) approximation ratio can be achieved (using scaling and reduction [20] ), where m is the number of items in the auction.
that the total sum of these weights assigned when Aj is picked is pj, because Aj covered rsize(Aj) new units.
Number the units in the order they are covered by our algorithm, breaking ties arbitrarily. Let this order be e1, e2, . . . , eN .
, where OP T is the total cost of the optimal cover.
Proof. Suppose e k was first covered when ask Aj was picked. At this point, the number of remaining (uncovered) units is at least N − k + 1. Now, consider any optimal solution. Since that solution can obviously cover all these N − k + 1 units at cost OP T , there must be at least one ask whose average cost of covering is at most
. Since our greedy algorithm chooses the set that covers most costeffectively, we must have that γ =
. Since the weight assigned to e k is γ, the claim follows. 
Proof. (of Proposition 2.3). Let
Using the previous lemma, we get:
where HN is the harmonic number. Finally, the claim follows from the fact that HN ≤ 1 + ln N .
With free disposal, finding a feasible solution (if one exists) to a combinatorial reverse auction is trivial, even in the multi-unit case. For example, one can simply accept all the asks. If this solution is not feasible, then no other solution is either.
Exchanges
In markets with many buyers and many sellers, exchanges are a natural choice for a market mechanism. In a combinatorial exchange [15, 17] , the trades that the market determines to occur can involve multiple buyers and multiple sellers each. Unlike auctions and reverse auctions, there is no auctioneer in a combinatorial exchange. Rather the participants in the exchange are allowed to both buy and sell items, or just buy or just sell. Both auctions and reverse auctions are special cases of exchanges. Also, the singleunit exchange is a special case of the multi-unit exchange (where each demand λ k j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}) so we only present the multi-unit exchange formally. Proof. Immediate from the N P-completeness and inapproximability of BCAWDP since that is a special case.
XOR-Constraints
Basic combinatorial auctions allow bidders to express complementarity between items (value of a bundle being greater than the values of its parts). However, consider a bidder that has submitted a bid of $4 for {1}, a bid $5 for {2}, and a bid $7 for {1,2}. Now the auctioneer could allocate 1 and 2 to the bidder for $9. So, the basic bidding language does not allow the bidder to express substitutability (value of a bundle being less than the sum of its parts). Full expressivity of the bidding language is obtainable by allowing XOR-constraints between bids [16, 3, 15, 13] .
XOR-constraints can also be used in combinatorial reverse auctions and combinatorial exchanges to achieve full expressiveness, but they have interesting implications on the complexity of winner determination.
Remark: In our model, a bidder 6 can insert XOR-constraints between any pairs of his bids he wants, but does not have to insert XOR-constraints between all pairs of his bids.
In combinatorial auctions, XOR-constraints do not change the theoretical complexity of clearing. This is understandable since the winner determination problem with XORconstraints can be encoded in polynomial time and space into a winner determination problem without XOR-constraints (simply add a dummy item for each XOR-constraint, and have the bids that are XOR'ed include that dummy item). So, it is trivial to find a feasible solution (accept no bids), hard to find an approximation better than n 1− , and N Pcomplete to solve the problem optimally.
Interestingly Proof. Clearly this problem is in N P because feasibility of a given solution can easily be checked in polynomial time. So, the beef is to prove that it is N P-hard. We show this using a reduction from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS problem [4] , which is N P-complete. In that problem, there is a ground set, and a set of subsets of the ground set, where each subset includes 3 items from the ground set. The question is whether all the items of the ground set can be covered by non-overlapping subsets. Given an instance of EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS, we construct an instance of a combinatorial reverse auctions with XOR-constraints as follows. For every one of the subsets given in the EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS we construct a bid that includes the corresponding 3 items. If two subsets share items, we insert an XOR-constraint between them. Now, the reverse auction instance has a feasible solution if and only if the instance of EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS has a solution.
Since combinatorial exchanges encompass combinatorial reverse auctions as a special case, finding a feasible solution in a combinatorial exchange with XOR-constraints is N P-complete. Since finding a feasible solution in combinatorial reverse auctions and exchanges with XOR-constraints is N P-complete, it follows immediately that finding any approximation to those problems is N P-complete.
Combinatorial auctions, reverse auctions and exchanges are optimally clearable in polynomial time using linear programming, if bids can be accepted partially. However, a recent paper shows that XOR-constraints make the clearing problem N P-complete even in that case [9] . The implications of other side constraints on market clearing complexity have also recently been studied [18] .
Lack of Free Disposal
Free disposal refers to the property that each party prefers (possibly not strictly) more to less. In other words, for each item, there is at least one party in the market who can dispose of any number of units of that item for free. Each winner determination problem discussed so far can be changed to reflect the case where items do not exhibit free disposal by simply changing the inequalities in the integer programming formulations to equalities. Despite the apparent similarities in the integer programming formulations for markets with and without free disposal, the problems are quite different.
In general, an auction cannot be formulated as a reverse auction (e.g., by simply changing signs) with the expectation that the solution for the reverse auction will be the same as for the auction. This is because in the reverse auction we are looking for lower priced bids, while in the auction we are looking for higher priced bids. The winning bid sets differ even if prices were negated. In the case of no free disposal (even without negating prices), the set of feasible solutions in an auction is the same set as in a reverse auction, but the set of optimal solutions is generally different. As we will show in the experiments, the time required to solve auctions and reverse auctions without free disposal can be very different.
We now characterize the complexity of the winner determination problem without free disposal. Proof. Clearly these problems are in N P because feasibility can easily be checked in polynomial time. So, the beef is to prove that they are N P-hard. We do this by showing that the following special case is already N P-hard. Let every bid have exactly three items, and price 1. Let the number of items be a multiple of 3. Now, if we had a polynomial time algorithm to find a feasible solution for this problem, we could use that algorithm directly to solve the EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS problem [4] , which is N Pcomplete. Now, let us go through an example to see how likely it is that a randomly chosen problem instance is feasible. Consider an auction (or a reverse auction) where each bid is randomly assigned σ items without replacement (and no duplicate bids are allowed). Modulo pricing, there are 
. Without free disposal, the winner determination problem in a combinatorial auction (single-unit or multi-unit), combinatorial reverse auction (single-unit or multi-unit), or a combinatorial exchange (single-unit or multiunit) cannot even be approximated in polynomial time (unless P = N P), even with integer prices and integer units.

Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2.7
In the rest of the paper we present experiments to see how hard these variants of the winner determination problem are in practice.
EXPERIMENTS
We designed the experiments so that each one would help illustrate the computational differences between a feature of an auction or exchange. We compared auctions and reverse auctions to see whether the fundamental difference in approximability shows up in practice. We compared free disposal and no free disposal. We also showed the hardness of exchanges. In our experiments, the units are integers, but the prices are reals.
All of the tests were run on a Pentium III 933 MHz processor, with 512 MB RAM. The test machine was running Linux 2.2. The algorithm that was used to solve the problems was CPLEX 7.0, a general-purpose mixed integer programming package. 7 CPLEX has recently been used to benchmark winner determination in the context of combinatorial auctions [1] . CPLEX uses a variant of A* search as its search algorithm (other search strategies are also available in CPLEX, but the default strategy turned out to be faster than any of the other variants that we experimented with). At every search node, a linear programming (LP) relaxation of the remaining subproblem is used to construct a heuristic upper bound. If the LP happens to return an integer solution, that is the optimal solution to that subproblem, so the subtree rooted at that node need not be searched. Quite frequently this occurs already at the root, in which case no search is conducted [19] .
In all of our experiments, for any given parameter setting, it took CPLEX significantly longer to find an optimal solution than it took to prove infeasibility. In the cases with free disposal, the problem was never infeasible (infeasibility could only happen if in a reverse auction there are not enough units of some item in all of the bids combined). In the cases without free disposal, the constraints are all equalities, and CPLEX is quite effective at using them algebraically to reduce search. On distributions where CPLEX tended to find an integer solution with LP directly (and search was therefore not needed), CPLEX also was able to prove infeasibility without search. On the other hand, on distributions where CPLEX conducted search to find an optimal solution, it tended to also require search to prove infeasibility. To keep the times comparable, in all of the experiments, we only report execution times for feasible instances.
We ran experiments on several benchmark distributions. All of the values reported in the graphs are means over 50 instances.
Single-Unit Auctions and Reverse Auctions
We used the following common benchmark distributions for single-unit auctions [16] :
• Random: For each bid, pick the number of items randomly from 1, 2, ..., m. Randomly choose that many items without replacement. Pick the price randomly from [0, 1].
• Weighted random: As above, but pick the price between 0 and the number of items in the bid.
• Uniform: Draw the same number of randomly chosen items for each bid. Pick the prices from [0, 1].
• Decay: Give the bid one random item. Then repeatedly add a new random item with probability α until an item is not added or the bid includes all m items. Pick the price between 0 and the number of items in 7 Recently ILOG released CPLEX version 7.1. To make sure that the problems that we claimed to be hard are hard for the newest version also, we reran all the hard cases (multiunit exchanges), and some of the easy cases, using CPLEX 7.1. Figure 3 top left, Figure 7 , and Figure 8 are for CPLEX 7.1. the bid. In the tests we used α = .75 since the graphs in [16] show that this setting leads to the hardest (at least for their algorithm) instances on average.
Previously these distributions have only been used for single-unit auctions with free disposal. We use these distributions to benchmark reverse auctions as well. When using the uniform distribution with no free disposal, we show experiments where the bid size is a factor of the total number of items-otherwise there is no feasible solution.
It is clear from Figure 1 that there is a complexity difference between auctions with and without free disposal. In fact, CPLEX takes two orders of magnitude longer to solve no free disposal auctions and reverse auctions on the random distribution. Although the difference is less dramatic on the weighted random distribution, it is still present. On both random and weighted random, reverse auction with free disposal rarely require search, and if they do, only a few nodes. Auctions with free disposal require search a bit more often, and use a somewhat larger number of nodes when search does occur. In free disposal settings, auctions and reverse auctions lead to search almost every time, and the search trees are large. Another interesting thing to note is that auctions without free disposal almost consistently take longer to solve than reverse auctions without free disposal for these two distributions. The easiest market type to solve was the reverse auction with free disposal. This is not surprising in light of its approximability.
In Figure 2 we again see the clear difference in execution time with and without free disposal. What is surprising here is that in the decay distribution, reverse auctions take much longer than standard auctions, even in the case with free disposal. This is the exact opposite of what we saw in Figure 1 and what we see on the uniform distribution. That shows that the theoretical approximability does not always translate to shorter solution times when going for an optimal solution. On the uniform distribution, for auctions and reverse auctions with no free disposal, there are no instances represented for bid size 15. That is because all of those instances were infeasible.
Multi-Unit Auctions and Reverse Auctions
We ran multi-unit auction experiments on two distributions. We used the same distributions for reverse auctions (by negating the prices of the bids)-a setting on which we have not seen any benchmark results before.
• Decay-decay: First assign the number of units for each item i: let item i have 1 unit. Repeatedly add another unit with probability α0. Then, give the bid one random item. Then repeatedly add a new random item (without repetition) with probability α1. Finally, for each item i in the bid, give that item quantity 1, then repeatedly add 1 to the quantity with probability α2. If the quantity is greater than ui, then set the quantity equal to ui. The price is computed by taking a random number between and 0 and 1 and multiplying by the total number of units in the bid. (A similar distribution appeared in [12] .) We used α0 = .99, and varied α1 and α2.
• CATS multipaths: This distribution models what might happen in an auction such as network bandwidth allocation [11] . As far as we know there have not been any performance results published for this distribution. Figure 3 shows that optimal clearing scales well on multiunit auctions and reverse auctions on the decay-decay distribution. In each of the graphs we see that reverse auctions with free disposal are routinely solved the fastest. Reverse auctions without free disposal are the slowest. In auctions, free disposal is only slightly faster than no free disposal. Before we ran these experiments we thought that auctions and reverse auctions without free disposal would have very similar run times since the set of feasible solutions is identical in these problems (the optimal solution is generally a different solution within that set). We conjecture that a specialized algorithm could mitigate the difference between the two. In any case, all of these instances were easy. For example at α1 = .6, α2 = .9, the LP solver of CPLEX returned integer solutions up front (and therefore, no search was needed) on 74% of the reverse auctions with free disposal, on 52% of the auctions with free disposal, on 50% of the auctions without free disposal, and on 22% of the reverse auctions without free disposal. Without free disposal (and in reverse auctions even with free disposal), the instances from CATS multipaths were almost all infeasible. On auctions with free disposal, Figure 4 shows that CPLEX's execution time grows rapidly with the number of bids. We observed that with as few as 2,000 bids, the main memory of our test machine could get exhausted, resulting in very poor performance due to paging. Clearly there is room for improvement in scalability on this distribution. 
Single-and Multi-Unit Exchanges
We have not seen any benchmarks on combinatorial exchanges before. Therefore, we introduce a new benchmark distribution which is similar to the decay-decay distribution for multi-unit auctions.
• Exchange decay-decay: For each bid, assign it one item. Repeatedly add an additional item with probability α1. For each item i in the bid, assign one initial unit and repeatedly add an additional unit of that item with probability α2. With probability .5, negate the quantity of the item to indicate selling the item. The price is a random number between 0 and 1, multiplied by the net number of units in the bid (which is negative as often as it is positive). This distribution yields a single-unit exchange when α2 = 0. However, CPLEX scales extremely poorly on multi-unit exchanges. Even with just 10 items and 100 bids, it takes a long time. As the number of bids increases further, the run time increases extremely rapidly. CPLEX quickly becomes unusable for the harder parameter settings in the distribution (the hardest setting is α1 = α2 = .8). Figure 6 shows that the complexity increases drastically in both α1 and α2, i.e., when each bid specifies supply and demand on a large number of items and units. Both with and without free disposal, the run time increases super-exponentially in those parameters. The parameter α1 is especially critical, as shown by the run time difference between Figure 6 Left and Figure 6 Right. As Figure 7 shows, optimal clearing scales extremely poorly on exchanges. As the number of bids increases further, the run time increases extremely rapidly. Even with only 12 items and 120 bids, winner determination takes a long time, even with free disposal. The clearing algorithms also keep track of the best solution found so far. This means that they implement the anytime property: the solution improves over time. In combinatorial auctions, the anytime property tends to work well in practice (although theoretically the inapproximability shows that no algorithm can guarantee a solution close to optimal in polynomial time). A good solution (within 99% of optimum) is often reached quickly [19] . However, as Figure 8 shows, the anytime property works very poorly in exchanges-even if there is free disposal. Solution quality tends to stagnate at around 85% of optimal. Wasting 15% of the economic value is clearly unacceptable in practice. Fur-thermore, without free disposal, it takes impractically long to find any feasible solution, not to mention a good one. To summarize, the experiments show that combinatorial auctions and reverse auctions have reached the scalability that is needed in practice for many applications, but on combinatorial exchanges, even the fastest general-purpose commercial optimization package scales so poorly that it is far from being able to run combinatorial exchanges in practice. This suggests developing special-purpose algorithms for combinatorial exchanges.
CONCLUSIONS
We showed how different features of a combinatorial market affect the complexity of determining the winners. We studied auctions, reverse auction, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal. We theoretically analyzed the complexity of finding a feasible, approximate, or optimal solution.
The most interesting results were the following. Reverse auctions with free disposal can be approximated (even in the multi-unit case), although auctions cannot. When XORconstraints between bids are allowed (to express substitutability), the hardness turns the other way around: even finding a feasible solution for a reverse auction or exchanges is N Pcomplete, while in auctions that is trivial. Finally, in all of the cases without free disposal, even finding a feasible solution is N P-complete.
We then studied the practical clearing time experimentally using a general-purpose mixed integer program solver on a variety of known benchmarks as well as ones which we introduced. As expected, cases with free disposal tended to be easier than ones without. On many distributions, reverse auctions with free disposal were easier than auctions with free disposal-as the approximability result would suggestbut interestingly, on one of the most realistic distributions they were harder. Single-unit exchanges were easy, but multi-unit exchanges were extremely hard. This suggests that faster, more specialized, algorithms are called for to scale winner determination to exchanges in practice.
